Approved for Release: 2013/06/25
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Secret NOFORN
Chapter 7
318
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The U-2 program not only provided information on individual Soviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet intentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in May 1960:
> Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether the situation might get beyond control—that someone on the other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war.... Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, resulting from the overflight program, has given us an ability to discount or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetorical than threatening and that our courses of action could be carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet interference.⁴
Dulles closed his report on the U-2’s accomplishments by putting the program in perspective as part of the entire national intelligence effort, noting that “in terms of reliability, of precision, of access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been, to put it simply, invaluable.”
The impact of the U-2 overflights on international relations is harder to measure. On the one hand, the intelligence they gathered was a major factor in keeping the United States from beginning a costly and destabilizing arms race in the late 1950s and early 1960s by showing that the Soviet Union was not engaged in major buildups of strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the other hand, violations of Soviet airspace by U-2s strained relations with Moscow at times and led to the collapse of the 1960 summit meeting. On balance, however, the impact of the U-2 on superpower relations was positive. Without the intelligence gathered by the U-2, the Soviet Union’s strategic military capabilities would have remained a mystery, making it very difficult for the President to resist pressure from the military, the Congress, and the public to carry out major increases in strategic weapons, which would have poisoned relations with the Soviet Union far more than the small number of overflights did.
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⁴ Ibid., pp. 9-10 (TS Codeword).
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Secret
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Approved for Release: 2013/06/25