Approved for Release: 2013/06/25
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Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
208
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[figure]
DDCI Marshall S. Carter
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Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on 12 October, when President Kennedy transferred “responsibility, to include command and control and operational decisions, with regard to U-2 reconnaissance overflights of Cuba” from the CIA to the Department of Defense.¹⁵ The Air Force then asked to borrow two of CIA’s U-2Cs.
The Acting DCI, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, US Army, reacted strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one point he remarked, “I think it’s a hell of a way to run a railroad. It’s perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act.”¹⁶ In a series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administration officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of the flights at such a crucial time. The Agency operation, Carter pointed out, was already in place and working well, whereas the Air Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly with the U-2C, which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, “To put in a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and communication and ground support system on 72 hours’ notice to me doesn’t make a God damn bit of sense, Mr. Secretary.”¹⁷ DDCI Carter admitted that the Air Force’s cover story was probably better than the CIA’s but suggested at one point, “Let’s take one of my boys and put him in a blue suit.”¹⁸ Realizing, however, that the pilot would probably have to come from the Air Force, Carter concentrated his efforts on trying to convince DOD and administration officials to conduct an orderly transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually taking over command and control. Carter’s efforts were in vain. The Air Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administration officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
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¹⁵ Memorandum for DCI McCone from McGeorge Bundy, “Reconnaissance Overflights of Cuba,” 12 October 1962, DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 17, folder 18 (TS).
¹⁶ Telephone conversation between DDCI Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962, DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 17, folder 18 (TS Codeword).
¹⁷ Telephone conversation between DDCI Carter and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962, DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 17, folder 18 (TS Codeword).
¹⁸ Telephone conversation between DDCI Carter and Gen. William McKee, 12 October 1962, DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 17, folder 18 (TS Codeword).
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Secret
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Approved for Release: 2013/06/25