Approved for Release: 2013/06/25
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Chapter 4
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availability of this new equipment.” Quarles objected that the satellites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build a first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower finally conceded that “one or two flights might possibly be permissible,” but he ruled out “an extensive program.” In light of the “crisis which is impending over Berlin” he did not want to be provocative.⁶
As the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower stuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, although the Soviet Union’s resumption of ICBM testing almost persuaded him to change his mind. On 10 April 1959, the President tentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he called in McElroy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdrawing his authorization, explaining that “there seems no hope for the future unless we can make some progress in negotiation.” Eisenhower remained worried by “the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail.” Although he agreed that new information was necessary, especially in light of the “distortions several senators are making of our military position relative to the Soviets,” Eisenhower believed that such information would not be worth “the political costs.”⁷
The President remained willing to consider flights that did not overfly Soviet territory, and in June he authorized two electronic intelligence collection missions along the Soviet-Iranian border. The two missions of Operation HOT SHOP took place on 9 and 18 June 1959. The first of these missions was noteworthy because it involved both an Agency U-2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two aircraft cruised along the Soviet border and made the first telemetry intercept ever from a Soviet ICBM during first-stage flight, 80 seconds after launch.⁸
Efforts to persuade the President to authorize penetration missions continued. On 7 July 1959, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell met with Eisenhower to discuss the possibility of a penetration flight
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⁶ Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 12 February 1959, WHOSS Alpha, DDEL (TS); Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, pp. 513-514; Beschloss, *Mayday*, p. 173.
⁷ Quoted in Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, pp. 514-515; Beschloss, *Mayday*, p. 176.
⁸ Mission folders 4120 (9 June 1959) and 4121 (18 June 1959), OSA records, job 67-B-972, boxes 10 and 11 (TS Codeword).
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Approved for Release: 2013/06/25