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Apollo 11 Technical Crew Debriefing, Volume 1 (scan)

NASA via ibiblio · 1969-07-31 · 251 pages · text by OCR

This is Volume 1 of NASA's Apollo 11 Technical Crew Debriefing, dated July 31, 1969. The Mission Operations Branch of the Flight Crew Support Division at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston prepared it, and it was originally classified Confidential. In it Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins go phase by phase through suiting, launch, powered flight, Earth orbit and lunar surface activities. They comment on suit fit, vibration, checklists, lunar dust, footing and poor sleeping conditions in the lunar module. A section titled Visual Sightings appears in the table of contents.

  • p. 30 …It was impossible to read an effect on any indicator in the cockpit. COLLINS This is…
  • p. 38 …the expected altitude was 174 and we read 176. The EMS was 3.3 plus. ARMSTRONG…
  • p. 39 …There's no way that the EMS could read 99.1 at docking. As I recall…
  • p. 40 ## CONFIDENTIAL Then I thrusted minus X until the DELTA-V counter read minus 100.5. I…
  • p. 46 …Neil and I both read a memo put out by MPAD, saying that for some failure…
  • p. 50 …We gave daily dosimeter readings, which as far as I'm concerned fall in a sort…
  • p. 51 …COLLINS And the dosimeter we just gave them a once-a-day reading on that dosimeter…
  • p. 68 …When you read me the numbers, you didn't note that I read star number 2…
  • p. 79 …The cabin temperature (translunar) was slightly warmer than we would like it, although the gage readings…
  • p. 130 …We had good helium pressure and read that out to MSFN. We went through the RCS…
  • p. 132 …the AGS, and give you an erroneous reading so you wouldn't pass. In any case…
  • p. 134 …There is a bad amount of data that the ground reads up to you in that…
  • p. 151 …They did approach the maximum numbers with a reading of approximately 94. Anyway, they weren't…
  • p. 169 …with time as evidenced by successive LPD readings. FCOD REP. Do you recall when you proceeded…
  • p. 170 …again, although at the time we were reading relatively low tank pressures. I think the OX…
  • p. 172 …We read the sine and cosine out of AGS (and I'm sure they copied that…
  • p. 175 …we were going to launch, so we read through the remainder of the simulated countdown and…
  • p. 235 …same exercises such as pressure-integrity check, reading the cabin down, and configuring the ECS. I…
  • p. 236 …We used a sequence of marking that involved an onboard averaging of five successive cursive readings…
## CONFIDENTIAL

trying to check all that out. It turned out to be sort of a witch hunt. For future flights, they might check into which is the best control mode for extracting the LM. I think it's okay the way we did it; but, if one of the springs gets hung up and throws you sideways, it may be better to do that maneuver under SCS control rather than CMC, FREE.

There were no abnormal dynamics. The thing backed out absolutely symmetrically as far as I could tell.

## 5.28 VEHICLE DYNAMICS OF CSM/LM

## DURING EJECTION FROM S-IVB

## 5.29 ADEQUACY OF ATTITUDE CONTROL AND STABILITY

The S-IVB was always very stable prior to, during, and after LM separation. SM RCS plumes had absolutely no effect on visibility or on S-IVB stability.

## 5.32 EVASIVE MANEUVERS

We thought at one time we might be somewhat rushed during that time period. It turned out that was comfortable and we were prepared to do the evasive maneuver. We could have done it 5 or 10 minutes earlier than it was called for. Luckily, it is not a maneuver that is time-critical. I think the present scheme of causing the S-IVB to overburn by

# CONFIDENTIAL

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 251 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.