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Apollo 11 Technical Crew Debriefing, Volume 1 (scan)

NASA via ibiblio · 1969-07-31 · 251 pages · text by OCR

This is Volume 1 of NASA's Apollo 11 Technical Crew Debriefing, dated July 31, 1969. The Mission Operations Branch of the Flight Crew Support Division at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston prepared it, and it was originally classified Confidential. In it Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins go phase by phase through suiting, launch, powered flight, Earth orbit and lunar surface activities. They comment on suit fit, vibration, checklists, lunar dust, footing and poor sleeping conditions in the lunar module. A section titled Visual Sightings appears in the table of contents.

  • p. 30 …It was impossible to read an effect on any indicator in the cockpit. COLLINS This is…
  • p. 38 …the expected altitude was 174 and we read 176. The EMS was 3.3 plus. ARMSTRONG…
  • p. 39 …There's no way that the EMS could read 99.1 at docking. As I recall…
  • p. 40 ## CONFIDENTIAL Then I thrusted minus X until the DELTA-V counter read minus 100.5. I…
  • p. 46 …Neil and I both read a memo put out by MPAD, saying that for some failure…
  • p. 50 …We gave daily dosimeter readings, which as far as I'm concerned fall in a sort…
  • p. 51 …COLLINS And the dosimeter we just gave them a once-a-day reading on that dosimeter…
  • p. 68 …When you read me the numbers, you didn't note that I read star number 2…
  • p. 79 …The cabin temperature (translunar) was slightly warmer than we would like it, although the gage readings…
  • p. 130 …We had good helium pressure and read that out to MSFN. We went through the RCS…
  • p. 132 …the AGS, and give you an erroneous reading so you wouldn't pass. In any case…
  • p. 134 …There is a bad amount of data that the ground reads up to you in that…
  • p. 151 …They did approach the maximum numbers with a reading of approximately 94. Anyway, they weren't…
  • p. 169 …with time as evidenced by successive LPD readings. FCOD REP. Do you recall when you proceeded…
  • p. 170 …again, although at the time we were reading relatively low tank pressures. I think the OX…
  • p. 172 …We read the sine and cosine out of AGS (and I'm sure they copied that…
  • p. 175 …we were going to launch, so we read through the remainder of the simulated countdown and…
  • p. 235 …same exercises such as pressure-integrity check, reading the cabin down, and configuring the ECS. I…
  • p. 236 …We used a sequence of marking that involved an onboard averaging of five successive cursive readings…
## CONFIDENTIAL

ALDRIN	Well, it's something you can't afford to get ahead of yourself and be moving around too fast. If there's any question at all and I think we all played it very cautiously until each of us in our own particular way realized that it was just no problem. As we adapted to it, we could go about any kind of movement that we wanted without any particular concern. But the stakes are pretty high and you can't afford to let these things get the best of you.
	4.5 OPTICS COVER JETTISON (DEBRIS)
COLLINS	I heard a little noise, but I saw no debris and I could not verify that they had jettisoned. I looked through both instruments and I couldn't see that they had jettisoned.
	4.6 SCS ATTITUDE REFERENCE COMPARISON
COLLINS	Okay.
ARMSTRONG	It went well. No problems.
	4.7 SM AND CM RCS
ARMSTRONG	We did hot RCS checks on the service module RCS prior to TLI. The intent here was to assure ourselves that we did, in fact, have an operable control system and that our hand controllers could, in fact, talk to something before committing ourselves to a lunar trajectory. We did that in

## CONFIDENTIAL

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 251 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.