From: Daryl Johnson
To: Jesse Rollins
Subject: UAP Summary.
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Jesse,

Good morning. In anticipation of today's one on one, I decided to write down some of my thoughts concerning the UAP topic as it relates to the NRC. Here are my thoughts;

Issues:

1-Agency reputation risk is high because we haven't provided guidance or situational awareness of the phenomenon to date; UAP flyover data is lacking; this information gap leads to no reporting or underreporting, flawed analysis and no assessment capability; 1843(a)(1)(c): Other matter to detect drones or UAP to better identify and report occurrences; NSIR leadership haven't considered safety and security risks posed by UAP; 1843(a)(1)(c): Other matter the Enhanced Weapons Rule will likely change the issue of not reporting by some licensees.

3-The kinetic and non-kinetic threat posed by UAPs is currently unknown. NRC's intelligence unit should prepare such assessments (both classified and unclassified).

4-There is growing interest in this topic given the number of recent FOIA requests to the NRC; Congressional hearings on the topic (both past and future); current and new legislation requiring mandatory reporting, disclosure, and transparency; growing Congressional caucus (which is bi-partisan) supporting greater data collection, disclosure and transparency; Congressional interest in UAP flyovers specifically over nuclear facilities and sites has been expressed publicly and privately; now, other DOD entities requesting information about drone flyovers from the NRC (e.g. DOD Nuclear Matters Office).

5-Other federal government agencies, the U.S. military, academia, and science and technology institutions are now getting involved to gain a better understanding of UAPs, the past stigma associated with this topic is gone.

6-During a past meeting addressing these concerns, NSIR leadership appeared dismissive, not engaged on implementing tailored UAP reporting guidance to increase awareness and vigilance; they did not support issuance of a security advisory about this topic, adding a new flyover collection category in the Protected Web Server (PWS) for better tracking and analysis of UAPs, or issuing a survey of licensee security force equipment and sensor capabilities, as recommended by myself and the former branch chief for the Force-on-Force program; asked me to conduct the review and analysis of potential UAP flyovers despite the lack of descriptive information specific to UAPs (i.e. flight characteristics, maneuverability, speed, acoustic signatures, tans-medium capabilities, etc.) from licensee security staff

Recommendations:
1-Brief NSIR and division management (again) concerning this topic and issues raised above to raise awareness and to receive guidance on the path forward, if any.
2-Approach NRC Office of General Counsel regarding FY-2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDA) UAP reporting requirements by the NRC to the Department of Defense (DOD) All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO); coordinate with NSIR's DPCP staff regarding this.
2-Issuance of a security advisory introducing the topic of UAPs, explaining how the phenomenon differs from drones, fixed wing aircraft; providing reporting guidance.
3-Create a separate collection category for UAP in the Protected Web Server (PWS). Coordinate with the headquarters operations center to provide situational awareness and train how to use this new category to report flyover activity just like we did for drones. This would assist with analysis of flyover activity and increase efficiency when responding to FOIA and external stakeholder requests.
4-Intelligence unit threat assessment addressing both potential kinetic and non-kinetic threat posed by UAPs (both classified and unclassified).
5-Increase liaison with DOD, Department of Energy, Federal Aviation Administration, and other entities involved in this issue (both government agencies and non-government organizations).
6-Expore future funding considerations or equipment lending/sharing programs (if any) for acquisition or purchase of enhanced sensors and other equipment used, 1843(a)(1)(c): Other matter

Be Risk Smart considerations:
1-Getting the sense that Congress knows there have been UAP flyovers at NRC licensed facilities (e.g. DOE, NORAD, FAA, or other entity disclosure) and may publicly disclose information which could embarrass the agency or political appointees such as the Chairman or other Commissioners.
2-NRC's annual reporting data requirement to AARO may be scrutinized by Congress and, unfortunately, we cannot provide accurate reporting data because the NRC has yet to inform licensees of the issue, give guidance, therefore there is no collection effort, reporting requirements, or 1843(a)(1)(c): Other matter currently at NRC licensees.
3-If something bad involving a UAP occurs (either against NRC licensees or elsewhere), the agency and security staff will be scrambling to inform, warn, provide guidance, create data collection process under extremely stressful, time-sensitive circumstances.
4-Potential kinetic and non-kinetic threats posed by UAP is currently unknown as is the origins of and operators' intentions.

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